CitrixBleed 2: Honeypot Analysis
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CitrixBleed 2: Honeypot Analysis

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citrix vulnerability honeypot cve-2025-5777

[+] Vulnerability Overview

Identifier: CVE-2025-5777 (“CitrixBleed 2”)

Disclosure Date: June 17, 2025 via Citrix security bulletin CTX693420; scope updated June 23, 2025

Nickname: “CitrixBleed 2” (inspired by CVE-2023-4966)

Severity: CVSS v4.0 9.3 (Critical)

[+] Executive Summary

In June 2025, security researchers identified a critical vulnerability affecting Citrix NetScaler ADC and Gateway appliances. The flaw enables remote attackers to leak sensitive memory contents without authentication by exploiting improper input validation in the authentication endpoint. The vulnerability threatens exposure of session tokens, user credentials, and system secrets.

[+] Impact

  • Pre-authentication remote memory disclosure in Citrix NetScaler ADC and Gateway appliances
  • Leaked memory fragments may include session tokens (including nsroot), credentials in plaintext, authentication cookies, and sensitive data
  • Attackers can hijack authenticated sessions and bypass MFA
  • Over 11.5 million attack attempts observed; CISA added CVE-2025-5777 to Known Exploited Vulnerabilities Catalog on July 10/14, 2025

[+] Attack Vector & Complexity

  • Attack Vector: Remote, unauthenticated access via HTTP POST to /p/u/doAuthentication.do
  • Complexity: Low - no credentials needed; trivial to script repeated requests
  • Authentication: Not required; malformed login parameter triggers vulnerability

[+] Affected Versions

Citrix NetScaler ADC / NetScaler Gateway:

VersionFixed Version
14.114.1-43.56 or later
13.113.1-58.32 or later
13.1-FIPS / NDcPP13.1-37.235 or later
12.1-FIPS12.1-55.328 or later

EOL versions (12.1 and 13.0) are not patched and remain vulnerable; upgrade strongly recommended.

[+] Technical Details

The /p/u/doAuthentication.do endpoint processes authentication POST requests. When attackers provide the login parameter without an equals sign or value (e.g., “login” alone), backend C code fails to initialize the memory variable. The resulting XML response injects leftover stack memory in the <InitialValue> element.

Attack Sequence:

  1. Unauthenticated malformed request
  2. Memory leak via <InitialValue> in response
  3. Attacker repeats to gather data fragments (~127 bytes per request)

Attack Flow Diagram

Example Malicious Request:

POST to /p/u/doAuthentication.do with parameter “login” (no equals sign or value)

Malicious Request Example

Example Response:

XML containing leaking stack memory in <InitialValue> tag, repeatable to harvest multiple fragments.

[+] Mitigation & Response

1. Patch Immediately

Upgrade to fixed versions:

  • 14.1 -> 14.1-43.56 or later
  • 13.1 -> 13.1-58.32 or later
  • FIPS/NDcPP, 12.1-FIPS -> apply corresponding fixed builds

No effective mitigation exists other than patching; WAF signatures may help but are not reliable.

2. Terminate Active Sessions Post-Upgrade

kill icaconnection -all
kill pcoipConnection -all

This ensures previously leaked tokens are invalidated.

3. Monitor & Hunt

  • Review logs for exploitation attempts
  • Deploy IDS rules to detect malformed /p/u/doAuthentication.do requests
  • Use anomaly analytics to catch suspicious behavior

4. Network Controls

  • Restrict external access to NetScaler appliances (VPN endpoints or AAA servers)
  • Segment appliance access behind VPN or firewall
  • Limit exposure surface

5. Follow-Up Actions

  • Engage forensic review if suspicious activity detected
  • Rotate credentials/tokens if session hijacking suspected
  • Use NetScaler Console insights or ADM file-integrity monitoring for changes

[+] Honeypot Analysis

Deployment & Setup

On June 25th, we deployed a fully interactive Citrix NetScaler honeypot designed to mimic a vulnerable Gateway environment.

Honeypot Login Interface

The honeypot:

  • Listens on port 443
  • Reproduces authentic login portal including /vpn/index.html
  • Includes realistic HTML/CSS/JavaScript user interface
  • Mimics key Citrix-specific behaviors
  • Uses domain vipbank.org with LetsEncrypt SSL certificates

Backend Simulation

Beyond the front end, the honeypot exposes simulated backend vulnerabilities:

  • Requests to /menu/ss, /vpn/../vpns/cfg/smb.conf, /rpc/../../../../../../../../etc/passwd receive plausible outputs
  • Interactions with /p/u/doAuthentication.do receive crafted application/vnd.citrix.authenticateresponse-1+xml payloads
  • XML responses follow real NetScaler schema including <PostBack>/p/u/doAuthentication.do</PostBack> and <CancelPostBack>/p/u/doLogoff.do</CancelPostBack> elements
  • Scanners and exploit scripts believe they interact with live, vulnerable appliance

Authentication Response

SMB Config Response

Intelligence Gathering

Every incoming connection is fingerprinted via ipinfo.io enrichment with:

  • Organization details
  • Geographic location
  • Reverse DNS information

Display: Live on-screen for hits to / and /vpn/index.html; fully logged in netscaler_honeypot.log

Persistent Storage: Companion toolset ip_mapper.py:

  • Parses honeypot log
  • Normalizes unique IP addresses
  • Enriches with metadata
  • Saves to ips.db (SQLite database)
  • Enables long-term analysis and threat intelligence correlation

Threat Tracking

Request Statistics

Requests Per Day

Threat Actor Activity

The honeypot also attracted threat actors looking to exploit CVE-2019-19781 (an earlier Citrix vulnerability).

[+] ips.db SQLite Database

Purpose

Acts as structured repository of every unique IP address touching the honeypot, enabling long-term threat analysis.

Data Structure

Two main tables:

  1. ipinfo: Canonical record of each IP with enrichment data

    • ASN/organization
    • Country and city
    • Reverse DNS hostname
    • First seen timestamps
  2. ip_reputation: Logs threat intelligence lookups

    • Tracks reputation across OSINT feeds
    • Correlates single attacker IPs over time

IP Reputation Chart

Analysis Capabilities

  • Track IPs probing honeypot weeks apart
  • Identify whether IP belongs to cloud provider, botnet, or opportunistic researcher
  • Build pivot tables of active regions and hosting providers
  • Generate heatmaps of attacker origins and behavior patterns
  • Highlight which organizations/ASNs responsible for majority of attacks

Database Query Results

[+] Top Offender Analysis

IP: 128.1.40.207

This address was identified as responsible for significant attack traffic against the honeypot, labeled in 6+ reputation feeds.

Top Offender Details

[+] Downloadable Resources

  • Raw Logs: netscaler_honeypot.log
  • IP Database: ips.db (GitHub repository)

Both files available for research and threat intelligence purposes.

[+] Key Takeaways

CVE-2025-5777 represents a critical pre-authentication vulnerability with trivial exploitation requirements. Organizations must prioritize immediate patching, session termination, and enhanced monitoring to defend against this widespread threat.